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I. INTRODUCTION
The system we currently use to deliver disability compen-
sation to injured veterans is deeply flawed. This system-the ser-
vice-connected disability compensation program administered to-
day by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA")-was de-
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signed and built for a different era. 1 But the system's original
framework persists, with enormous negative consequences.
VA's system was originally designed to consider average
loss of earning capacity based on disability within the context of a
mostly agrarian and industrial economy; it was not designed for
today's service economy and diversified labor market.2 VA's sys-
tem was originally designed to consider the severity of individual
disabilities based on uniform and precise measurement in percent-
age increments; it was not designed to take into account the enor-
mous expenditure of time that such determinations would require
when the number and complexity of disability claims multiplies, as
they have in recent decades. 3  VA's system was originally de-
signed to consider a relatively narrow range of common disabili-
ties; it was not designed to consider the multifaceted, invisible
wounds of war and environmental toxins that are the hallmarks of
recent conflicts.4 VA's system was originally designed to consider
and decide disability claims that were completely insulated from
judicial review; it was not designed to decide claims subject to
federal court review and the growing body of court-made law that
exists today.5 VA's nearly century-old framework has performed
1. The roots of the service-connected disability compensation program
stretch back to the nation's founding. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat.
95 (continuing payment of military pensions for one year to "invalids who were
wounded and disabled during the late war"). The modem version of the pro-
gram has its origins in World War I. In 1917, Congress amended the War Risk
Insurance Act to allow veterans who incurred injuries, or aggravated pre-
existing injuries, in the line of duty to receive ongoing payment as compensa-
tion, based on the severity of those injuries and the average loss of civilian oc-
cupational earning capacity. See War Risk Insurance Act, ch. 26, 40 Stat. 102
(1917); War Risk Insurance Act, ch. 105, 40 Stat. 398 (1917).
2. See James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The
Origins of the Modern Veterans' Benefits System from 1914 to 1958, 5
VETERANS L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2013).
3. See A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING VETERANS FOR
DISABILITY BENEFITS 92-138,252-71 (Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007).
4. See id at 139-200; see generally INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND
SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008).
5. See James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited. Lessons
from the History of Veterans' Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L.
REV. 135, 135-37 (2011).
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precisely as one would expect any other antique to perform when
confronted by the new and more complex demands of a changing
world-poorly.
6
Today, a range of challenges besets the service-connected
disability compensation system: claims backlogs, appeals back-
logs, remand backlogs, layer upon layer of suffocating complexity,
outmoded technology, and poor customer service.7 Hoping that
VA's current system framework will effectively fulfill the pro-
gram's fundamental goal of accurately and efficiently compensat-
ing veterans for service-connected injuries 8-not just with respect
to today's veterans, but with respect to succeeding generations of
veterans too-is a risky proposition.
To be sure, there have been some modest improvements to
the system in the last couple of years: the claims backlog has
shrunk; modem technology is finally, if haltingly, being integrated
into the program; and new initiatives may be increasing efficiency
in some respects. 9 But these improvements reflect changes at the
margins. At present, nearly everyone agrees that the program
6. For a superb discussion of these and other historical considerations,
how they have shaped VA's current system, and what they suggest about future
reform efforts, see James D. Ridgway, A Benefits System for the Information
Age, in GLIMPSES OF THE NEW VETERAN: CHANGED CONSTITUENCIES,
DIFFERENT DISABILITIES, AND EVOLVING RESOLUTIONS 131 (Alice A. Booher
ed., 2015).
7. Robert N. Davis, Veterans Fighting Wars at Home and Abroad, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 389, 400-04 (2013).
8. See VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO ELIMINATE THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS
BACKLOG 3 (2013), available at http://benefits.va.gov/transfor-
mation/docs/VA_StrategicPlan toEliminate the CompensationClaimsBac
klog.pdf (outlining the VA's transformation plan "to deliver faster, better deci-
sions for Veterans").
9. Daniel L. Nagin, Goals vs. Deadlines: Notes on the VA Disability
Claims Backlog, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 50, 71-74 (2015). It is important to note
that even the apparent improvements at VA are not without controversy. For
example, there is increasing evidence that VA's efforts to reallocate resources to
reduce the claims backlog have led to an increase in the VA appeals backlog.
See Tara Copp, 'Tsunami' of Veterans Appeals Approaches, WASH. EXAMINER
(Jan. 22, 2015, 2:25 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tsunami-of-
veterans-disability-appeals-approaches/article/2559098 (quoting member of
House of Representatives VA subcommittee as saying "We're trading a claims
backlog for an appeals backlog .... We're trading the devil for the witch.").
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needs a meaningful overhaul to reflect modem demands, modem
systems management, and modem science.10 What remains uncer-
tain and deeply contested is what precisely that overhaul should
look like. Proposals run the gamut. 11 What is more, the politics of
veterans benefits suggests that substantial change will be contro-
versial, no matter how well intentioned the various actors and insti-
tutions whose voices should and do count. 12
As important as it is for veterans' advocates to consider
these larger questions of systemic reform and to participate in de-
bates about large-scale change, much work remains to be done to
ensure that veterans with new and pending claims receive justice
today. Thus, while the larger debate continues to unfold, it contin-
ues to be useful to dissect individual areas of veterans benefits law
in order to highlight more precisely the flaws in VA's existing
framework for adjudicating disability claims. By examining the
choke points in the existing system, we can better ensure that to-
day's veterans receive fair treatment-and help ensure that the les-
sons of the past and recent past inform the design of the next sys-
tem.
10. See generally THE VA CLAIMS BACKLOG WORKING GROUP REPORT
(2014) (containing recommendations for reform developed by bipartisan U.S.
Senate working group).
11. Compare Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, or Transfor-
mation? The Current State of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability
Benefits Adjudication Process and Why Congress Should Modify, Rather than
Maintain or Completely Redesign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3
(2008) (arguing for some amount of reform, but not radical overhaul), with The
Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom on the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs Claims Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Disability Assistance & Mem I Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs,
110th Cong. 48-51 (2007) (statement of Linda J. Bilmes, Faculty, Professor,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 110hhrg34310/pdf/CHRG-
11 Ohhrg343 10.pdf (recommending, among other things, that in order to address
systemic delays in adjudication processes the VA should (1) grant all claims
when filed and then audit, in manner akin to the IRS, a sampling of the claims to
review for accuracy and (2) should simplify the disability rating categories to
yield four basic levels of disability).
12. See Laurence R. Heifer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating
the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 156-57
(1992).
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To this end, this Essay explores some of the dimensions of
traditional evidence law when it is applied in the realm of veterans
benefits. In particular, the Essay focuses on VA credibility deter-
minations, which have been the subject of several important court
decisions in the last few years and are a common issue raised on
appeal when veterans challenge adverse VA decisions on judicial
review.' 3 The central point is that even though the veterans bene-
fits field is permeated with so-called "veteran friendly" presump-
tions and legal doctrines, including with respect to the weighing of
evidence, VA continues to disbelieve veteran claimants by relying
on a common law credibility test that is too often nonsensical as
applied and decidedly veteran unfriendly in practice. I call this
dynamic the credibility trap.
When VA communicates to a veteran that it does not be-
lieve him or her, VA sends a powerful and disquieting message to
those who have worn the uniform. So, it is especially important
that VA get it right when making an adverse credibility determina-
tion. No agency can be expected to adjudicate complex cases,
which disability claims very often are, with 100% accuracy. But
the framework VA uses to decide whether a veteran is credible
should have sufficient protections to limit the number of false neg-
ative errors. The credibility trap has downstream consequences
too, beyond depriving individual veterans of earned compensation.
It contributes to VA's own administrative burdens, as claims de-
nied on credibility grounds are prone to enter already backlogged
appeal, remand, and claim reopening pipelines. The point is not
13. The role of lay evidence in VA adjudications has received increasing
attention in the law review literature, although the question of VA credibility
determinations regarding lay evidence generally has not received sustained
analysis. See, e.g., Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second "Splen-
did Isolation "? Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REV.
1437, 1473-80 (2014); Sarah K. Mayes, Unraveling the PTSD Paradox: A Pro-
posal to Simplify the Adjudication of Claims for Service Connection for Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder, 6 VETERANS L. REV. 125, 128-29 (2014); Evan R.
Seamone & David M. Traskey, Maximizing VA Benefits for Survivors of Mili-
tary Sexual Trauma: A Practical Guide for Survivors and Their Advocates, 26
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 381-83 (2014); Alison Atwater, Comment, When
is a Combat Veteran a Combat Veteran?: The Evidentiary Stumbling Block for
Veterans Seeking PTSD Disability Benefits, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 243, 244-46
(2009); Andrew Woodbury, Note, Witnesses to War: Using Lay Evidence to
Assert a Veteran's Claim for Benefits, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 159, 160-61 (2013).
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that VA should somehow be prohibited from evaluating a veteran's
credibility1 4 or from finding a veteran's statements incredible, or
that VA should approve every claim a veteran files. Rather, as
explained more fully below, the point is that the credibility trap
reveals one of the less visible tensions in VA benefit scheme when
common law standards from adversarial proceedings are married to
the supposedly informal, non-adversarial framework of the veter-
ans benefit system. There are important lessons from this experi-
ence for efforts to reform VA system.
II. VA SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY
COMPENSATION PROGRAM
VA's service-connected disability compensation program is
a critical source of support for the nation's injured veterans. There
are nearly 22 million veterans in the U.S. 5 In 2013, 3.5 million
veterans received service-connected disability compensation total-
ing $54 billion.' 6 In the last fifteen years, as the veteran's popula-
tion has aged and newer generations of veterans who served in the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have entered the system, the per-
centage of veterans receiving service-connected compensation has
more than doubled. 17
There are five basic elements to a service-connected disa-
bility compensation claim. The first three are: (1) status as a vet-
eran; (2) existence of a current disability; and (3) a connection be-
tween the veteran's service and the disability.1 8 If these three re-
quirements are established, VA must then (4) decide the severity of
the disability by reference to the standards found in the Schedule
for Rating Disabilities. 19 Finally, VA must (5) decide the date the
14. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 133, 145 (2005) (describing the
"well-recognized role of the Board" to "assess in the first instance the credibility
of the hearing testimony of a claimant"), withdrawn, 19 Vet. App. 334 (2005),
reinstated nunc pro tunc sub nom. Padgett v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 159 (2008).
15. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, VETERANS' DISABILITY COMPENSATION:
TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2014), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45615-VADisability_2.pdf.
16. Id.
17. See VA Budget Request for FY 2016, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.va.gov/opa/budget-briefing-charts.asp (last visited May 6, 2015).
18. See38U.S.C.§§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.4 (2014).
19. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.1.
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entitlement to compensation arose. 20 These five elements may
sound simple.21 However, each element is marked by enormous
complexity.
22
Moreover, depending on the initial determination VA
makes in a case, these steps and the evidence relevant thereto are
examined and re-examined at multiple levels of administrative re-
view. VA is made up of fifty-seven regional offices and a central-
ized Board of Veterans' Appeals ("BVA") in Washington, D.C.23
The appropriate regional office-via a rating officer-is responsi-
ble for making the initial decision on a claim. If a veteran is not
satisfied with the outcome at that stage-whether because VA
completely denied the claim, partially denied the claim, assigned
an improper disability rating, or determined an improper effective
date for compensation-there are multiple layers of administrative
appeal available. These include a Decision Review Officer hearing
at the regional office and an appeal to the BVA, where Veterans
Law Judges decide appeals from regional offices. 24 As described
more fully in the sections to follow, at each stage of the adjudica-
20. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110; 38 C.F.R. 3.400.
21. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL ch. 3 (Barton F. Stichman et al.
eds., 2014) (providing an overview of the eligibility requirements for service-
connected disability compensation benefits).
22. James D. Ridgway, The Veterans'Judicial Review Act Twenty Years
Later: Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 251,295-98 (2010).
23. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1017
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that veterans' disability compensation claims begin at
one of the VA's fifty-seven regional offices before proceeding to the BVA); VA
Careers, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFF., http://www.vacareers.va.gov/about-
va/divisions.asp (last visited May 6, 2015); see also OFFICE OF AUDITS &
EVALUATIONS, VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INSPECTION OF VA REGIONAL
OFFICE ATLANTA, GEORGIA 18 (2014), available at
http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-14-00902-207.pdf (noting that disability
claims are processed by fifty-six VA regional offices and a Veterans Service
Center in Cheyenne, Wyoming); U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 2014
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 8 (2014), available at
http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014-VAparFullWeb.pdf (noting fifty-six
regional offices).
24. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 21, at pt. V (describ-
ing the VA claims adjudication process). Once the BVA issues a final decision,
judicial review is available at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
See 38 U.S.C. § 7252.
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tion process, VA's assessment of the veteran's credibility can play
a crucial role determining whether the veteran's claim is approved,
only partially approved, or denied.
III. VA ASSESSMENT OF LAY EVIDENCE
In order to appreciate the troubling ways in which VA
sometimes renders adverse credibility determinations within this
system, one must first take into account the singular backdrop
against which these credibility determinations are supposed to be
made. First, unlike virtually all other administrative adjudication
systems, VA's service-connected disability compensation system
is intended to be uniquely pro-claimant-that is, the entire system
is intended to be veteran friendly.25 Second, there is no deadline
by which a veteran must file a claim for service-connected disabil-
ity compensation-claims may, and often are, filed years and
sometimes decades after a veteran's military service, meaning that
numerous evidentiary challenges may exist in adjudicating a
case. 26 Third, VA has an affirmative duty to assist claimants
throughout the benefit application and adjudication process-VA
"shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evi-
dence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim."27 Fourth,
"in the veterans' context, traditional requirements for admissibility
[of evidence] have been relaxed., 28 Fifth, under the benefit-of-the-
doubt doctrine, whenever the evidence is in equipoise, and unless a
different standard applies because of the particular issue in dispute,
VA must find in favor of the veteran.29 And sixth, the entire VA
system is intended to be fundamentally "non-adversarial."3 °
25. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011).
26. James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analy-
sis of Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 113, 115-16 (2009).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1).
28. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
28 U.S.C. 5107(b)).
29. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) ("When there is an approximate balance of posi-
tive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a
matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.").
30. Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 326 (2000) (en banc) (describing
"the VA pro-claimant nonadversarial claims adjudication process"); see also
Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 508 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir.
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This backdrop, one would think, might suggest that VA
would also be subject to a particularly onerous standard before it
denies a claim on the basis that it disbelieves the veteran. Not so.
VA considers a veteran's statements to be "lay" evidence,
as distinguished from medical evidence. 3 Lay evidence can be
critical to a successful claim for service-connected disability com-
pensation. Such evidence may provide the critical link to establish
that an in-service event occurred, that the veteran experienced ill-
ness or injury at a particular point in time, that an injury or illness
has a particular origin, that an illness or injury interferes with the
veteran's activities of daily living or ability to obtain or maintain
employment, and the like. Numerous cases have found that lay
evidence can provide the necessary link in substantiating a veter-
an's claim for compensation.32
While the VA has a duty to consider pertinent lay evidence,
VA "retains discretion to make credibility determinations and oth-
erwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence."
33
1996) ("[VA] is not a party trying to disprove a claim; indeed, VA's special
obligations to assist claimants are the very antithesis of adversarial claims adju-
dication."). It is also worth noting that-although not always directly implicated
in cases involving a contested credibility determination-where a dispute does
arise regarding the meaning of a veterans benefits statute, the statute must be
interpreted liberally in favor of veterans. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994) (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991)). For a
discussion of the interaction of this veterans-friendly interpretative principle
with other statutory interpretation doctrines, see Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win,
Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v. Gardner's Presumption that Interpretive
Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans' Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59
(2011).
31. In deciding a claim, the VA must consider "all pertinent medical and
lay evidence." 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§
3.303(a), 3.307(b) (2014). While this Essay assumes that the claimant harmed
by an adverse credibility determination is a veteran, the claimant before VA
could just as easily be a dependent or survivor of a veteran.
32. See, e.g., Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1376-77 (holding that the VA erred
in concluding that veteran's lay evidence by itself was inadequate to establish
element of veteran's claim).
33. Id. at 1376. Whether lay evidence is competent is a distinct-and
antecedent-question. Id. at 1376-77. If lay evidence is incompetent, the cred-
ibility question is never reached. My focus is on the second question: whether
and how competent lay evidence is determined to be credible or incredible.
2015
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This Essay focuses on that discretion-and how it is exercised.3 4
In making credibility determinations, Veterans Law Judges
("VLJs") 35 at the BVA may consider the following factors: inter-
est, self-interest, bias, inconsistency, bad character, desire for
monetary gain, and witness demeanor. 3
6
The seminal case regarding the credibility of lay evidence
is Caluza v. Brown, a 1995 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims ("the Veterans Court") that was affirmed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.37 These
courts-and the BVA-consistently cite to Caluza as the founda-
tional basis for the factors VLJs should rely upon when assessing
the credibility of lay evidence. 38  The key language in Caluza is
this, and it is worth excerpting citations included:
The credibility of a witness can be impeached by a
showing of interest, bias, inconsistent statements,
or, to a certain extent, bad character. See State v.
Asbury, 187 W. Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d 891, 895
(1992); see also Burns v. HHS, 3 F.3d 415, 417
34. To be clear about my goals here, the unique evidentiary issues that
pertain to claims based on personal assault and military sexual trauma ("MST")
are specialized topics outside the scope of this Essay. For a discussion of those
topics, see Seamone & Traskey, supra note 13, at 384-86. The same is true of
the many questions that pertain to VA's evidentiary standard for PTSD found in
38 C.F.R. 3.304(f), which among, other things, requires "credible supporting
evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred." For a discussion of that
topic, see generally Mayes, supra note 13. Rather my purpose is at a layer re-
moved from these subjects: to examine the tensions that exist in general when
common law evidentiary standards from adversarial proceedings are married to
the supposedly informal, non-adversarial framework of the veterans benefit
system.
35. VLJs are agents of, and act in the name of, the BVA when they con-
duct appeal hearings and issue decisions. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL,
supra note 21, at ch. 13.1 ("Veterans Law Judges ... are the principal actors in
the BVA decision-making process . . . ."). This Essay uses the terms VLJ and
BVA mostly interchangeably, except in places where it is helpful to emphasize
that it is an individual VLJ who presides at a hearing and makes credibility de-
terminations regarding a veteran's lay evidence.
36. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
37. 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995), aft'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
38. See, e.g., White v. Shinseki, No. 08-2526, 2010 WL 1017046, at *2
(Vet. App. Mar. 22, 2010) (quoting Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 511).
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(Fed. Cir. 1993) (testimony was impeached by wit-
ness' "inconsistent affidavits" and "expressed
recognition of the difficulties of remembering spe-
cific dates of events that happened . . . long ago");
Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 389
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (impeachment by testimony which
was inconsistent with prior written statements).
Although credibility is often defined as determined
by the demeanor of a witness, a document may also
be credible evidence. See, e.g., Fasolino Foods v.
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 761 F. Supp. 1010,
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re National Student Mar-
keting Litigation, 598 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D.D.C.
1984). 39
What should be obvious from this excerpt is that the Caluza
Court borrowed tools for assessing credibility from numerous other
legal contexts and imported them wholesale into the veterans bene-
fit context. There is nothing inherently wrong with having done
so. Indeed, at the time Caluza was decided, the Veterans Court
was but five years old, and judicial review of VA decisions was in
its infancy.4" As it set about to construct for the first time a court-
made law of veterans benefits, the Veterans Court naturally needed
to look to doctrines, conventions, and tools used in other legal con-
texts in order to fulfill the function Congress created for the Veter-
ans Court.4 '
We should ask, however, whether VLJs have used the fac-
tors first articulated in Caluza in a defensible and appropriate
way--one that fits the singular ecosystem of the veterans benefits
framework. In a system intended to be veteran friendly and non-
39. Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 511.
40. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 4051, 102
Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2012)) (establish-
ing the Court of Veterans' Appeals).
41. But see Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ad-
monishing Veterans Court for looking outside the veterans benefit context to
guide interpretation of veterans benefit statute and regulations). For a discussion
of the increasing trend in the other direction (that is, towards incorporating ele-
ments of law from outside the veterans benefits context), see Hadfield Moshi-
ashwili, supra note 13, 1511-12.
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adversarial, where substantial gaps in time between a veteran's
military service and the adjudication of his or her claim can create
difficult evidentiary questions, where the agency has a statutory
duty to assist the veteran, where the benefit of the doubt must be
given to the veteran, and where there are widespread and lengthy
delays in deciding individual claims and appeals once they are
filed-given all of this, has it made sense for VLJs to use the same
factors to determine a veteran's credibility as a trier of fact would
use for a plaintiff testifying in a tort suit or a defendant in a crimi-
nal trial?
It turns out that the informality and non-adversarial process
that are supposed to be the hallmarks of the veteran-friendly VA
system have, in perhaps surprising ways, created genuine challeng-
es in the area of credibility determinations.
IV. VA CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
Decisions by VLJs and the Veterans Court about witness
credibility frequently cite Caluza, and they frequently refer to one
sentence from Caluza in particular: "[t]he credibility of a witness
can be impeached by a showing of interest, bias, inconsistent
statements, or, to a certain extent, bad character." 42 Particularly
telling is the Caluza Court's phrasing here: witnesses can be "im-
peached" when certain "showing[s]" are made.43 This language
invokes the trappings of a traditional adversarial proceeding, where
each side in the litigation is armed with attorney representation and
seeks through questioning to undermine the credibility of the ad-
versary's witnesses. Indeed, the Caluza Court derived this key
sentence from the 1992 West Virginia Supreme Court decision in
State v. Asbury.44 In Asbury, the West Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed a defendant's conviction for assault following a jury tri-
al. 45 The Asbury Court saw no error in the prosecutor's cross ex-
amination of a defense witness, finding that the questions were a
42. See, e.g., White, 2010 WL 1017046, at *2 (quoting Caluza, 7 Vet.
App. at 511).
43. Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 511.
44. 415 S.E.2d 891, 895 (W. Va. 1992) ("The term 'credibility' includes
the interest and bias of the witness, inconsistent statements made by the witness
and to a certain extent the witness' character.").
45. Id. at 897.
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proper and expected attempt by one party to impeach an adverse
witness's credibility through cross-examination suggesting bias or
interest.46
VA benefit adjudications exist in an entirely different uni-
verse.47 In appeal hearings before a VLJ, there is no such cross-
examination of a veteran.48 Counsel does not represent VA. A
VLJ will of course ask questions of a veteran to elicit relevant evi-
dence and develop the record, but a VLJ is not permitted to cross-
examine the veteran and should not be in the business of making a
"showing" of any kind.49 VA is prohibited from seeking to defeat
the veteran's claim. 50
The credibility standard identified in Caluza therefore-at
least rhetorically-seems quite out of place in the non-adversarial
veteran-friendly context of VA appeals. In this way, as an initial
matter, we might be concerned that the rhetoric found in Caluza
may contribute to unjustifiably aggressive adverse credibility de-
terminations by VLJs. Whether Caluza is a contributing factor or
not, there is ample evidence that VLJs have frequently exceeded
their authority in discrediting lay evidence from veterans.
51
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
48. 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c) (2014) ("Parties to the hearing will be permit-
ted to ask questions, including follow-up questions, of all witnesses but cross-
examination will not be permitted." (emphasis added)).
49. Id.
50. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 144 (1991) ("Congress has
designed and fully intends to maintain a beneficial non-adversarial system of
veterans benefits .... I[m]plicit in such a beneficial system has been an evolu-
tion of a completely ex-parte system of adjudication in which Congress expects
VA to fully and sympathetically develop the veteran's claim to its optimum
before deciding it on the merits. Even then, VA is expected to resolve all issues
by giving the claimant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. In such a beneficial
structure there is no room for such adversarial concepts as cross examination,
best evidence rule, hearsay evidence exclusion, or strict adherence to burden of
proof." (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-
963, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5795)).
51. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (stating that the VA's interpretation of the standard for assessing the cred-
ibility of lay evidence-which, in the VA's view, required lay evidence to be
corroborated by medical evidence-is "legally untenable"); Kahana v. Shinseki,
24 Vet. App. 428, 433 n.4 (2011) ("We generally agree ... that too often the
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But there is another concern about the Caluza standard that
has more to do with process than substance-and about which we
should be equally, if not more, troubled. This is where the credi-
bility trap truly comes into play. In a traditional adversarial pro-
ceeding in which one party seeks to impeach the other party's wit-
ness, the second party will always have the opportunity to attempt
to rehabilitate the witness whose credibility has been undermined.
Whether through questions proffered on re-direct, through a rebut-
tal witness, or through closing argument, a party can always take
steps before the case is submitted for decision to respond and to
defend a witness's credibility.5
2
In the non-adversarial context of a VLJ hearing, the veteran
has no opportunity to rehabilitate himself, except perhaps in one
narrow circumstance. If the regional office decision on appeal to
the VLJ denied the claim by finding the veteran's lay evidence
incredible, then the veteran is presumably on notice to some extent
that his credibility is at issue. The veteran is aware that he should
use the opportunity of the VLJ hearing to seek to bolster his credi-
bility by explaining inconsistencies, providing context for past
statements, offering corroborating evidence, making a strong per-
sonal presentation, or the like. 3 If the regional office denied the
veteran's claim in whole or part on the basis of finding the veter-
an's lay evidence incredible, the veteran would receive notice of
Board makes overbroad categorical statements regarding the competency and
credibility of lay testimony.").
52. What is more, an attorney can also seek, in the moment, to protect a
witness who is being impeached on cross-examination-by objecting to the
questions that are being proffered. Such objections might go to the form of the
question or the substance of the question. Timely and well-grounded objections
may have the effect of limiting the harm done to a witness whose credibility is
under attack. For a general discussion of impeachment and rehabilitation of
witnesses in an adversarial proceeding, see Penny J. White, The Art of Im-
peachment and Rehabilitation, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2002, at 29.
53. While this sentence and others use the male pronoun to refer to the
veteran, it must be noted that an increasing percentage of veterans are women.
See generally NAT'L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AMERICA'S WOMEN VETERANS: MILITARY SERVICE
HISTORY AND VA BENEFIT UTILIZATION STATISTICS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/specialreports/finalwomens report 3 2 12 v
_7.pdf (stating that by 2035 women will make up 15 percent of all living veter-
ans).
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the adverse credibility finding via the Statement of the Case issued
by the regional office or the written decision issued by the Deci-
sion Review Officer ("DRO") in cases where the veteran requested
review by a DRO.5 4 The VLJ would then reinforce that notice and
be duty bound to explain to the veteran at the outset of the BVA
appeal hearing that the question of credibility is before the VLJ
and to suggest to the veteran the submission of evidence that might
help him substantiate his claim.55 As discussed below in Part V,
this scenario-particularly with respect to the regional office plac-
ing the veteran on notice in the first instance that his personal cred-
ibility has been rejected-may not be very likely at all.
In any event, outside of this single circumstance, a VLJ's
determination that the veteran's lay evidence is incredible will,
almost by definition, catch the veteran off guard. The veteran will
have no opportunity to respond at all before the VLJ issues the
Board's final decision in the matter. Instead, the veteran will first
learn that his credibility was even in question when he receives the
final Board decision in his appeal.56 This is the credibility trap. It
exists not because of nefarious actors but because of dynamics in-
herent to the current veterans benefit framework.57
First, a VLJ is extraordinarily unlikely to declare during an
appeal hearing that the VLJ has already found-or is inclined to
find or is considering finding-the veteran incredible. Indeed, to
do so would presumably violate the VLJ's duty to impartially con-
sider the evidence in the case and to avoid pre-adjudicating the
case.
58
54. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 21, at pt. V (providing
an overview of the VA claims adjudication process).
55. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2014); see also Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.
App. 488, 496-97 (2010); Procopio v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 76, 81 (2012).
56. At this point, the record is closed and the only further appeal is to the
Veterans Court.
57. See Arneson v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 379, 382 (2011) ("Unlike a
traditional judicial appeal where review is of the record, the opportunity for a
personal hearing before the Board is significant because it is the veteran's one
opportunity to personally address those who will find facts, make credibility
determinations, and ultimately render the final Agency decision on his claim."
(citing McDowell v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 207, 214 (2009)))
58. See Bryant, 23 Vet. App. at 496 (stating that "there is no requirement
to preadjudicate an issue or weigh the evidence" and that a VLJ "should focus
2015
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Second, the informal, non-adversarial nature of a VLJ hear-
ing makes it unlikely that a veteran will receive even informal and
indirect warning that a VLJ questions his credibility. It might be
appropriate to expect an experienced litigator to detect during a
trial that a line of questioning to a witness reflects skepticism about
the witness's credibility, and to further expect the experienced liti-
gator to respond in the moment through the give and take of a trial
to protect and bolster his witness. But that is not the format of a
VLJ hearing, that is not the design of the veterans benefit adjudica-
tion system, and those are not appropriate expectations for pro se
veterans or non-attorney advocates. 59 Most veterans appear before
VLJs with non-attorney representation.60
Third, a sizeable number of appeals are decided without a
hearing-meaning there is no opportunity for the veteran in those
cases to interact directly with the VLJ and to receive even minimal
cues that the VLJ views, or might view, the veteran's credibility
with skepticism.
6 1
on the issues that remain outstanding, and whether evidence has been gathered
as to those issues").
59. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (May-
er, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he veterans' system is constructed as the antithesis of
an adversarial, formalistic dispute resolving apparatus. It is entirely inquisitorial
in the regional offices and at the Board ... where facts are developed and re-
viewed. The purpose is to ensure that the veteran receives whatever benefits he
is entitled to, not to litigate as though it were a tort case."). To be clear, in mak-
ing these arguments, I am not suggesting that more formalistic procedures akin
to a civil trial and correspondingly greater attorney involvement in the VA sys-
tem are the solution. Whether the VA benefit system should be open or closed
to attorney representation of veterans, should encourage or discourage attorney
representation, should limit or expand the role of attorneys based on the stage of
the case-all are questions of considerable controversy, complicated history,
and continuing debate. For a discussion of some of the general tensions between
formality and informality and between inquisitorial and adversarial modes in the
mass administration of benefit claims, see generally JERRY L. MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS
(1983); Jon S. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kaflka: The Misapplication of the
Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1289 (1997).
60. See U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BOARD OF VETERANS'
APPEALS: ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2013), available at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/ChairmansAnnualRpts/BVA2013AR.pdf.
61. See id. at 27.
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And fourth, the BVA-unlike the regional offices-is re-
quired by statute to provide reasons or bases for its decision, in-
cluding the reasons or bases for its credibility determinations.
6 2
This is the first moment when VA is duty bound to explain in
greater detail the grounds for its decision.
Put together, we are left with a troubling paradox. VLJs
possess wide latitude to decide whether a veteran's lay evidence is
credible-the same wide latitude that a judge would possess when
presiding at a traditional adversarial bench trial. But, unlike the
parties participating in such a bench trial, the informal and non-
adversarial design of VA appeal process deprives many veterans of
the opportunity to effectively defend themselves against an attack
on their credibility.
To underscore the point that veterans may receive no mean-
ingful notice at the agency level that their credibility is very much
in dispute, consider that the Veterans Court described the reasons
or bases requirement found in 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) for VLJ de-
cisions as "serv[ing] a function similar to that of cross-examination
in adversarial litigation."6 3 In other words, it is only in the written
final decision that marks the end of the administrative process that
the adjudicator must show his hand with respect to his assess-
ment-or, as the case may be, his critique-of the evidence, in-
cluding a veteran's lay evidence. The Veterans Court's use of the
term "cross-examination" is telling because it is suggestive of pre-
cisely what I have argued here-that VLJs, understandably given
their assigned role, engage in a kind of adversarial cross-
examination of the evidence through their written decisions, but in
doing so of course afford no opportunity for the witness to re-
spond, explain, or rebut the problems seized upon by the VLJ.
In short, when a veteran first learns that his credibility is
under attack and the specific basis for that attack, it is often too late
to do anything to defend himself before the agency. Hence the
term "trap" to describe this phenomenon. A veteran who disagrees
with a VLJ's credibility finding can certainly appeal to the Veter-
62. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(f) (2014); see also
Bryant, 23 Vet. App. at 494 ("[T]he Board's statement of reasons or bases was
inadequate ...."); Procopio v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 76, 84 (2012) ("[T]he
Board's statement of reasons or bases was not inadequate .... ").
63. Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 40 (1994).
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ans Court.64 But there, the veteran is generally precluded from
offering new evidence to rehabilitate his credibility or otherwise. 65
Moreover, the Veterans Court will review the VLJ's adverse credi-
bility finding under a deferential standard-whether the VLJ's
finding was clearly erroneous.66 The veteran's best hope might be
to argue to the Veterans Court that the VLJ failed in his written
decision to provide adequate reasons or bases for disbelieving the
veteran, in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). Whether this ar-
gument is successful will depend on the extent to which the VLJ
adequately justified in his written decision the adverse credibility
finding. Even then, if the veteran is successful in his appeal to the
Veterans Court, the veteran will secure only a remand back to the
BVA for further proceedings. The veteran will have spent many
months-if not more than a year-just to get right back where he
started.
V. A CASE EXAMPLE
While there do not yet appear to be any reported cases that
address this paradox, the problem is percolating beneath the sur-
face. Consider the following case, an otherwise unremarkable ap-
peal which resulted in an unpublished memorandum decision from
the Veterans Court.67 A veteran filed a claim with VA for service-
64. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266 (providing the Veterans Court with
exclusive jurisdiction over BVA appeals and procedures for filing a notice of
appeal). True, a veteran can also file a motion for reconsideration with the BVA
itself. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000. However, that is typically an unfruitful strate-
gy. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 21, at ch. 14.3.1 (describing
reasons that motions for reconsideration are "generally not an effective means
for obtaining a change in a previous final BVA decision").
65. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) ("Review in the Court shall be on the record
of proceedings before the Secretary and the Board.").
66. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4).
67. This same troubling dynamic-veterans who have been blindsided by
adverse credibility findings in BVA decisions-can been seen in some of the
cases we have reviewed and accepted on referral for our Veterans Court docket
at the Veterans Legal Clinic. These case referrals prompted much of my think-
ing about the role of BVA credibility findings in the veterans benefit system.
The Veterans Legal Clinic is part of the Legal Services Center of Harvard Law
School, a community-based public interest law firm and clinical teaching pro-
gram.
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connected disability compensation. 68 The regional office denied
the claim, but did not state in its decision to deny that the veteran's
personal credibility had anything to do with the adverse outcome.
The veteran appealed the denial to the BVA, where the case was
assigned to a VLJ. The VLJ denied the claim because the VLJ
found the veteran not credible about an in-service occurrence. 69
At the Veterans Court, the veteran argued through counsel
that the BVA's decision to deny the claim based on an adverse
credibility determination was fundamentally unfair given that the
regional office had never specifically called the veteran's personal
credibility into question.70 Counsel argued that the veteran was
therefore never properly on notice that his credibility would be in
dispute at the BVA, in violation of Bernard v. Brown.7 1 In Ber-
nard, the Veterans Court found that the BVA erred when, without
advance notice to the veteran, it proceeded to reopen a claim and
decide that claim on the merits in circumstances where the regional
office has denied the claim to reopen and never developed or adju-
dicated the merits.72 The BVA's decision to adjudicate the claim
on the merits undermined the "extensive procedural requirements
to ensure a claimant's rights to full and fair assistance and adjudi-
cation in the VA claims adjudication process."73
The Veterans Court rejected counsel's argument that the
principle articulated in Bernard applied to the BVA's decision to
make an adverse credibility determination without first placing the
veteran on adequate notice of that risk. In rejecting counsel's ar-
gument, the Court made three points. First, Bernard was distin-
guishable because, unlike adjudicating a claim to reopen at the
BVA in the first instance, the question of credibility is inherently
subsumed within claims on appeal.74 So long as the regional office
had adjudicated the veteran's claim for compensation, then the
veteran's credibility was fair game for the BVA to consider, even
if the regional office had been silent on the credibility question or
68. Stegall v. Shinseki, No. 10-3268, 2012 WL 445919, at *1 (Vet. App.
Feb. 14, 2012).
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at * 1.
71. Id. (citing Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993)).
72. Bernard, 4 Vet. App. at 394.
73. Id. at 392.
74. Stegall, 2012 WL 445919, at *2.
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had even found the veteran credible.75 Second, the veteran should
have been on notice that his credibility would be an issue before
the BVA because it was an obvious question in the case and the
regional office had sent notices describing the types of corroborat-
ing evidence the veteran might obtain. 76 And third, the Court not-
ed that the veteran had recourse by virtue of the instant appeal to
the Court, where the veteran could argue that the BVA was clearly
erroneous in finding the veteran not credible or failed to offer ade-
quate reasons or bases for finding the veteran not credible. 77 In
other unpublished memorandum decisions, the Veterans Court has
rejected a version of this same argument for nearly identical rea-
sons.
78
The Veterans Court's resolution of this argument is certain-
ly understandable to a point. As one of the unpublished decisions
put it, there is no existing authority "for the proposition that a party
must be notified that his credibility, or the credibility of any evi-
dence, is for consideration. 7 9 Sure enough, the Bernard decision
that served as the linchpin of the veterans' arguments did not in-
volve a credibility determination. Instead, it involved a BVA deci-
sion-without notice to the veteran-to reopen a claim and deter-
mine the merits of that claim where the regional office had done
neither. 80
75. See id at *2 ("[T]he board has jurisdiction to decide any question
pertaining to a matter that the [regional office] has decided.... The determina-
tion of credibility of any evidence pertaining to such matters is a fundamental
function that is committed to the Board." (citations omitted)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Dailey v. Shinseki, No. 11-2660, 2013 WL 1964837, at *6
(Vet. App. May 13, 2013); Cavalli v. Shinseki, No. 11-1898, 2012 WL 6082708,
at *3 (Vet. App. Dec. 7, 2012).
79. Dailey, 2013 WL 1964837, at *6.
80. The holding in Bernard did not explicitly limit the principle that the
veteran must be given adequate advance notice to the BVA's potential adjudica-
tion of previously unadjudicated "claims," a term that has a particular legal
meaning within the veterans benefits scheme. See, e.g., Cacciola v. Gibson, 27
Vet. App. 45, 53 n.2 (2014) ("Although there have been efforts to definitively
define what is and is not a 'claim,' such efforts have not produced uniformity.").
The Bernard court used the term "questions":
[T]he [c]ourt holds that[] when... the [BVA] addresses in its
decision a question that had not been addressed by the [re-
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What is missing from the discussion, however, is a fuller
sensitivity to the difference between credibility being at issue in a
general sense and a veteran's credibility being subject to attack on
specific grounds. For starters, regional office initial rating deci-
sions, Statements of the Case, and decisions from DROs, are typi-
cally long, intricate documents filled with boilerplate language.8 1
And when such documents finally address the facts of an individu-
al veteran's case, they are written at a fairly high level of generali-
ty. Even when they may suggest indirectly that the regional office
disbelieves a veteran, they almost never give a reason, let alone a
specific reason. 82 Instead, a regional office decision will, for ex-
ample, in a personal assault case, state in conclusory and non-
personalized terms that "[t]he evidence of record does not provide
credible evidence that the claimed stressor occurred., 8 3 Or in the
case of an in-service sexual assault, the decision will state, "To this
date the record of evidence has not shown that a military sexual
gional office], it must consider whether the claimant has been
given adequate notice of the need to submit evidence or argu-
ment on that question and an opportunity to submit such evi-
dence and argument and to address that question at a hearing,
and, if not, whether the claimant has been prejudiced thereby.
Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993) (emphasis added). A "question"
is "[a]n issue in controversy; a matter to be determined." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1366 (9th ed. 2009). According to the Veterans Court, Bernard is
not helpful here because a veteran's credibility is always in controversy-is
always a matter to be determined. See Dailey, 2013 WL 1964837, at *6 (provid-
ing that "credibility determinations are an inherent part of every decision by a
trier of the fact[,]" including decisions of the regional offices and the BVA).
81. For discussions of VA's use of lengthy and unhelpful boilerplate
notices, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-395, VETERANS
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: CLARITY OF LETTERS TO CLAIMANTS NEEDS TO BE
IMPROVED 35-38 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/240/234416.pdf; David E. Boelzner, In Sight, It Must Be Right: Judicial
Review of VA Decisions for Reasons and Bases vs. Clear Error, 17 RICH. J.L. &
PUB. INT. 681, 693 (2014); Ridgway, supra note 26, at 121.
82. Decisions issued by the regional office-whether in the form of ini-
tial rating decisions, DRO decisions, or Statements of the Case-are not subject
to the adequate reasons or bases requirement. These decisions must give a rea-
son for the decision and a summary of the evidence considered, but specifics or
adequate explanations are not required. 38 U.S.C. § 5104 (2012).
83. Redacted documents from this case are on file with the author.
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trauma took place."84 The veteran will typically be provided no
further explanation for why his or her lay account of what occurred
has been disbelieved. Indeed, decisions will rarely if ever even
convey the sense that the veteran has actually been personally dis-
believed-only that more evidence is needed if the claim is to be
substantiated. For these reasons, even where a veteran is arguably
on notice that something like credibility is at issue, it is only in the
most vague and non-specific sense. The veteran will not have any
inkling of the specific reasons-such as particular alleged incon-
sistencies in the veteran's lay evidence-that led to the failure to
convince the regional office.
Whether or not the regional office denied the claim for rea-
sons having anything to do with the credibility of the veteran's lay
evidence, the BVA of course serves as the final agency arbiter of
the veteran's credibility. 85 As described above, however, unlike a
party in an adversarial proceeding who can readily identify during
the course of motion practice or trial the specific bases for an at-
tack on his credibility and can take steps to respond to the attack, a
veteran appealing to the BVA will typically have no warning of the
specific inconsistencies, alleged biases, or other grounds a VLJ
might rely on to discredit the veteran. 86 The veteran will first re-
ceive notice of these grounds when the appeal is over-that is,
when the veteran receives final agency action in the form of a
BVA decision.
84. Redacted documents from this case are on file with the author.
85. See Arneson v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 379, 382 (2011) ("[T]he op-
portunity for a personal hearing before the Board is significant because it is the
veteran's one opportunity to personally address those who will find facts, make
credibility determinations, and ultimately render the final Agency decision on
his claim." (citing McDowell v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 207, 214 (2009))).
86. To be clear, pursuant to Bryant and Procopio, a veteran might be told
by the VLJ at the appeal hearing what additional evidence might be needed to
substantiate the claim. However, that is quite different than putting the veteran
on notice that there are specific grounds for calling into question his credibility,
identifying those grounds, and providing the veteran an opportunity to respond
directly to the particular grounds cited. The submission of additional evidence
may not be responsive directly to the specific grounds the VLJ considers.
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VI. THE CREDIBILITY TRAP IN ACTION
To appreciate how the credibility trap actually plays out in
practice-and to highlight how the BVA is prone to overreach in
making adverse credibility determinations-it is helpful to look at
the specific facts in dispute in a case example. As it happens, the
very same unpublished case decision described above-in which
counsel unsuccessfully argued to the Veterans Court that the BVA
had violated Bernard by blindsiding the veteran with its credibility
determination-provides a revealing exemplar.
There, the veteran had filed a claim for disability compen-
sation stating that he had mental disorders arising from an in-
service physical assault.8 7 According to the veteran, the regional
office denied the claim without addressing his personal credibil-
ity.88 The veteran appealed to the BVA, where a hearing was con-
ducted. In the written decision following the hearing, the BVA
agreed that the veteran was suffering from diagnosed mental disor-
ders.89 The BVA also agreed that there is "at least provisional
medical evidence linking [the veteran's] disability to an in-service
injury, the alleged beating." 90 The BVA, however, found that the
in-service personal assault never occurred. 9' According to the
BVA, the veteran's account of the assault was "not credible, given
inconsistencies in statements made to VA, and given a lack of doc-
umentation from civilian and military authorities regarding the
alleged assault." 92 The BVA decision went on to identify what it
described as multiple inconsistencies in the veteran's lay evi-
dence. 93 From all appearances, the veteran did not learn that the
BVA had identified these putative inconsistencies and considered
them decisive to the outcome of the case until the BVA issued its
written decision. 9
4
87. Stegall v. Shinseki, No. 10-3268, 2012 WL 445919, at *1 (Vet. App.
Feb. 14, 2012).
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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One by one, the Veterans Court concluded that the BVA
failed to provide adequate reasons or bases for finding the veter-
an's lay evidence incredible. Among other things, the BVA had
found the veteran not credible because of an absence of certain
records.9 5 This is an extraordinarily common basis for the BVA to
discredit a veteran's lay evidence, a dynamic the Veterans Court
and the Federal Circuit have repeatedly sought to curtail.96 The
records in question in this case were law enforcement records re-
garding the assault, which the veteran said he had reported to au-
thorities at the time.97 The BVA issued its decision in 2010.98 The
alleged assault occurred forty-six years earlier, in 1966. 99 The rec-
ord in the case indicated that local law enforcement had informed
VA that it did not have records from as long ago as 1966.100 In
scathing language, the Veterans Court declared that "[i]t is hardly
logical to derive a negative credibility finding, even in part, be-
cause the [veteran's] allegations are not corroborated by nonexist-
ent records. '"10
The BVA also found the veteran not credible because "var-
iations [had] occurred in [his] story since the filing of his claim."10 2
This too is a common basis for finding a veteran not credible, as it
is not difficult to locate putative inconsistencies in records that
span hundreds if not thousands of pages and many years of a veter-
an's life. Here, the BVA seized upon the following variation: in
filing his claim with VA, the veteran stated that personnel from
one branch of service assaulted him; at the hearing before the
BVA, the veteran stated that personnel from a different branch of
service assaulted him. 10 3 The Veterans Court found this rationale
from the BVA lacking:
95. Id. at *6.
96. See, e.g., AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Buczynski v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 221, 224 (2011) (holding that the BVA
may not treat absence of evidence as substantive negative evidence).
97. Stegall, 2012 WL 445919, at *6.
98. Id. at *1.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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It is clear from all the veteran's testimony ... that
he did not know the men who allegedly attacked
him and that he was speculating on who they might
have been from second-hand hearsay. The [c]ourt
does not perceive that any inconsistency about such
a peripheral matter is to be used as grounds for a
negative credibility determination. 104
The BVA also found evidence that the veteran was "fabri-
cating his story" by pointing to a single line in a psychologist's
report. 1°5 In that line, the psychologist observed that it was not
clear to the psychologist whether the veteran had "actual memo-
ries" of the assault or had "reconstructed it later by interviewing
several people who witnessed it."' 1 6 This, the Veterans Court con-
cluded, was an entirely insufficient basis to suggest fabrication on
the part of the veteran. According to the Veterans Court, the psy-
chologist's statement "neither highlight[s] an inconsistency nor
logically lead[s] to a conclusion of fabrication."'0 7  Rather, the
psychologist's statement simply reflected that the psychologist
"was uncertain where memory left off and hearsay began."' 10 8
The Court concluded its assessment of the BVA's credibil-
ity findings by counseling the BVA: "Sometimes corroboration or
refutation of allegations such as those presented in this case is not
merely a matter of reviewing documents."' 1 9 The Court set aside
the BVA decision and remanded the case for further proceedings
and readjudication. I 10
The point is that each of the BVA's grounds for finding the
veteran incredible was relatively easy to rebut, if not refute out-
right. But only if one knows these grounds are being considered
by the BVA. Had the veteran been on notice that the BVA was
challenging his credibility on these grounds, he-and his advo-
cate-had ready and persuasive responses: the lack of documenta-
tion from law enforcement should be immaterial because law en-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id.
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forcement has not maintained records from that period; the incon-
sistency in describing the branch of service of his attackers should
not be given significance because it is a trivial difference and the
veteran acknowledged he could only speculate about the identity of
his attackers; the single sentence from the psychologist's report
simply should not, by its own terms, suggest fabrication on the part
of the veteran.
VII. REMEDIES
The credibility trap is at odds with a system that is intended
to be non-adversarial, uniquely pro-claimant, and veteran friendly,
and in which VA has a duty to assist the veteran and to apply the
benefit of the doubt doctrine to the evidence. What, if any, remedy
exists for the credibility trap? Fully exploring potential remedies is
beyond the purpose of this short Essay. For the moment, a few
general possibilities are worth mentioning-none of them, howev-
er, without weaknesses.
Some potential remedies are within the Veterans Court
powers. First, the Veterans Court introduced the Caluza credibility
standard into VA cases when judicial review of VA decisions was
in its infancy;"'. the Court could, in response to arguments from
appellants' counsel, presumably amend the standard to reflect the
experience of the standard's application at VA during the past
twenty-five years. This might entail, for example, requiring an
inconsistency to be material before the BVA relies upon it to make
an adverse credibility determination. This would not be an un-
precedented doctrinal innovation. In the immigration law context,
several circuits at one point made use of, and sometimes still use, a
"heart of the claim" test, whereby inconsistencies could only be
grounds for an immigration judge's adverse credibility determina-
tion in an asylum case if the inconsistencies were truly material to
the claim at issue in the case." 2
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
112. See Tania Galloni, Keeping It Real: Judicial Review of Asylum Credi-
bility Determinations in the Eleventh Circuit After the REAL ID Act, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1037, 1047 (2008) (describing the heart of the claim test, but also
examining the impact of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress' effort to override
the heart of the claim test).
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Second, the Veterans Court could, under Bryant and Pro-
copio, require the BVA in some circumstances to place the veteran
on notice that personal credibility is at issue. The Court could also
interpret Bernard to extend to credibility determinations, requiring
that the BVA provide advance notice of some kind when personal
credibility is directly at stake and to undertake a prejudice analysis
when advance notice is not provided. Among many potential
downsides, including uncertainty whether these doctrinal reforms
are achievable, these court-driven remedies entail creating more
law-further complicating the maze of rules that burden the sys-
tem and too often imperfectly serve their original goals of encour-
aging accurate and efficient decisions.11 3
Some potential remedies are within VA's powers. VA
could require that decisions from regional offices that rely on per-
sonal credibility to deny a claim to actually say so and to provide
greater specificity as to the reasons for that determination. VA
could require that the pre-hearing notices issued to veterans in ad-
vance of a BVA appeal hearing highlight that personal credibility
will potentially be at issue and provide guidance about how veter-
ans can prepare for and address this issue. VLJs could be tasked
with doing the same at the outset of a BVA hearing. Among many
potential downsides, these possibilities entail adding to the already
overwhelming amount of information, both in the form of written
notice and otherwise, VA provides to veterans. Any single piece
of information is easily lost in this avalanche of communication,
much of it already boilerplate, confusing, and unhelpful.
Some remedies are within the advocacy community's pow-
ers. Advocates who represent veterans at the BVA could be more
attentive to the credibility trap and attempt prophylactically to ad-
dress what issues the VLJ might seize upon to discredit the veter-
an's lay evidence. Advocates who represent veterans at the BVA
could, consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) and Bryant and Pro-
copio, inform the VLJ before the appeal hearing's close that the
veteran wishes to be informed of any evidence in the record the
VLJ considers to be negative evidence and to be informed of what
types of additional evidence might rebut this negative evidence.
Both of these possibilities have disadvantages too. As to the first,
for the same reason that it is relatively easy for a VLJ to pick apart
113. Ridgway, supra note 22, at 253.
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a voluminous record and find numerous inconsistencies, it is rela-
tively difficult to anticipate which grounds the VLJ will seize upon
for rendering a credibility determination and immunize the veteran
from having his lay evidence discredited on those grounds. As to
the second, it is not clear that VLJs are fully responsive to the prof-
fered interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), Bryant, and Proco-
pio.
Finally, the most far-reaching remedies are of course within
Congress' powers. Congress, faced with innumerable questions
about the future shape of the service-connected disability compen-
sation system,' 1 4 has mostly tinkered around the edges. At a min-
imum, any remedy that Congress might consider for the credibility
trap-whether targeted or part of a larger reform effort-should be
mindful of the following: it should not elongate the appeal pro-
cess; it should not have the net effect of increasing the complexity
of the system; and it must balance the need for efficiency with the
value of accuracy. 115
VIII. CONCLUSION
The potential remedies briefly noted above have many
more nuances than can be catalogued here. And there are certainly
many other remedies one might consider, both small scale and
large scale. In the end, no matter how we think about the credibil-
ity trap-whether as a problem in need of an immediate fix or an
unavoidable element of the system we have-the phenomenon
ought to inform our thinking about what the next version of VA's
adjudication system might look like. That next system would be
best served if a veteran had a meaningful and timely opportunity to
respond directly to VA-and not just to the Veterans Court-when
VA decides not to believe the veteran.
114. See supra note 11 for examples of the continuum of reform proposals
that have been proposed to Congress.
115. See Ridgway, supra note 6, at 131, for Professor Ridgway's more
extended discussion of these and other considerations in reform efforts.
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